RB Leipzig: The Money-Making Machine (Only Surpassed by Chelsea and Benfica)

By selling Yan Diomande to Real Madrid for €125 million, RB Leipzig not only secured their biggest sale in history but also definitively confirmed their decade-long financial success story. The Bulls have surpassed Dortmund as the German club with the highest sales volume and, above all, have become a benchmark for managing a growing reality in world football: multi-club ownership.

The 525 percent profit on the Ivorian winger's deal is the pinnacle of a strategy adopted from the outset: acquiring players from secondary markets or smaller clubs. This was the case with Diomande: €20 million paid to Leganés, from the Spanish second division, followed by a €125 million sale a year later.

But the examples don't stop there: many now-established names came from lower tiers before arriving in Leipzig, such as Dani Olmo and Gvardiol (both from Dinamo Zagreb), Matheus Cunha (Sion), or Antonio Nusa (Club Brugge).

The model is very clear: only players under 24 are signed, earning lower salaries than a giant like Bayern, and whose profile fits the club's long-established identity: high press, verticality, and transitions. Nationality is not a primary requirement.

The mastery and knowledge of these less-explored markets (or at least not consistently explored) is due to a data center that has been fed for at least a decade and supplies the Red Bull group. In other words, what is now considered fundamental for any elite club, the famous energy drink company's executives systematized over ten years ago.

Therefore, there are no purchases made on a whim. One of the implemented rules is to have a replacement in the pipeline before a sale. The common practice is to have the successor's signing already completed or well underway before the money comes in.

Ten years after reaching the top tier of German football, the corrosive sentiments regarding the Red Bull project seem more dispersed. Long gone are the days when opposing club fans threw bull heads onto the pitch in protest against what they called cheating or a distortion of German football, which even today turns its nose up at the signs of aggressive capitalism.

At the heart of the criticism was the 50+1 rule (the percentage that must belong to the club and not investors) and, more than anything, the prohibition of associating the company with the club's name. The story is well known: the original club was SSV Markranstadt, but the new owners, when they bought it in 2009, named it RasenBallspor Leipzig, with "rasen ball" translating to "lawn ball sport." With such a primary expression, the acronyms obviously imposed themselves (RB), thus fulfilling the initial objective of associating the Red Bull letters in the narrative – nothing to do with VfB Leipzig, Germany's first champions.

Time has shown that the Austrian company was here to stay and change the market. Investing in a club in the eastern part of the country (still poorer than the west) filled a geographical void, and an aggressive marketing policy attracted many young fans who now identify with the brand and know that today they might be cheering on a potential star who might be gone tomorrow – because this has been the acknowledged business model: Leipzig is a bridge, but also the university for a vast group that includes RB Salzburg (Sesko, Upamecano, Szoboszlai), RB Bragantino (Brazil), and New York Red Bulls (USA).

Since 2016/17, when they were promoted to the Bundesliga, RB Leipzig has generated €1.28 billion in sales, placing them, according to the Football Observatory, third worldwide, only behind Benfica (€1.32 billion) and Chelsea (€1.48 billion).

These figures currently reflect the buying and selling of player transfers, with a substantial profit (€320 million). Unlike their competitors Benfica and Chelsea, the Germans have not yet managed to produce batches of young players from their academy, as it was only established in 2015. But few would doubt that in ten years, the conversation will be entirely different.