AFCON 2021: To improve (against Sudan) Eguavoen’s Super Eagles must attack slower

When it was announced that Austin Eguavoen would take charge of Nigeria following the sacking of Gernot Rohr, the initial reaction was of derision.

Since then, that response has slowly turned.

While Tuesday’s win over Egypt was vital in that sea change, it was a YouTube video, put out by digital sports news studio ATHLST, that kicked off the process. 

In it, the erstwhile technical director of the Nigeria Football Federation (NFF) talked about the country’s historic footballing ideal, and explained some of the tactical ideas that underpinned the 1994 Super Eagles vintage.

The video – over 20 minutes in length – caught fire, not so much because it seems most assumed Eguavoen would have no tactical knowledge whatsoever, but because it concerned perhaps the one thing every Nigerian will gladly break bread over: the 1994 team. Their success, unique as it was (and still is, because number 5 in the world!!!), has come to be viewed as a template, and so every departure from it is an abdication.

So when the former Nigeria international talked about “wing play”, the central dogma, it was easy to make the connection to what lay in store in Cameroon. 

So it was.

The Super Eagles’ 1-0 triumph over the Pharaohs has been praised to the heavens as a return to the identity of Nigerian football. While it would be impossible to contend the performance was not a good one, or that there is no cause for optimism on that basis, it is important to realise that the actual work of turning that performance into something more refined and, therefore, sustainable is not only harder, but is still to come.

Because crude is really what it was.

This is a phenomenon observable whenever a manager who strongly espouses a particular philosophy comes into a role: the first match in charge is typically a cartoonish showcase of that tactical idiosyncrasy. 

When Jurgen Klopp took over at Liverpool in 2015, his first assignment against Tottenham was defined by pressing, almost to the detriment of any actual work in possession. The same thing happened when Quique Setien took charge of Barcelona in 2020: in his debut match in charge, the Catalan side attempted 1,005 passes and hit a ludicrous 82 percent possession share in a 1-0 win over Granada.

The win over Egypt was Eguavoen’s competitive debut (at least this time around), and the pattern held. The performance against the seven-time African champions was the pure, uncut Eguavoen: extremely vertical, based on width, take-ons and crosses. Quintessential to the point of caricature, its execution was no doubt helped by the determination of both the players and the manager to draw a line in the sand under what had gone before. It was invigorating, heady, and stirring.

It was also imprecise, lacking in rhythm and tempo variations, and frantic.

There was some consternation at half time when the statistics card came up on the TV coverage and showed Egypt had recorded a greater share of the possession, especially as Nigeria had spent what seemed like large swathes of the opening period on the offensive, and had dominated territory and chances.

However, considering that, in many models, possession is a function of passes and not time on the ball, that should not have come as a surprise. It also told a story: the Super Eagles seldom tried to establish any sort of sustained control in deep central areas, and even the passes that were played centrally were simply to facilitate passes out to the wingers.

Now, there is nothing wrong with being direct in itself. It is important to establish this. There is no singular module for football.

However, whatever the shape or strategy, some tenets retain relevance. If you wish to be ultra-direct, there is risk involved, as with any other approach. To borrow from the wisdom of Juanma Lillo, “the quicker the ball goes forward, the quicker it comes back”. That is the attendant peril. While Egypt’s tactics on the day were abstruse and chaotic, there were spaces to be exploited on the counter due to issues with Nigeria’s organisation in rest defence.

There is also the often neglected utility of varying the tempo as a means of breaking down opponents. While Nigeria had enough opportunities to have scored more than they did, how many were truly gilt-edged? Not enough, especially in light of their opponent’s poor performance.

Part of the reason for this was that the team mostly played at one (breakneck) speed.

In combat sports, the necessity of varying attacks and using different tools – or even one tool in different ways – is well understood. For instance, a boxer will typically establish a rhythm and tempo to lull his opponent, before attacking by breaking that rhythm and catching the adversary off-guard.

By having different speeds, it is easier to create openings: if all you will throw is a right hand (or a cross) every two seconds, then your opponent can simply shell up and take the battering on his arms without much vital damage.

This is why a more considered tempo is sometimes necessary. (There is, of course, the small matter of fitness in a more transitional game, but that is a separate concern.)

It is the work of addressing those concerns before they become terminal – through more patient build-up and/or better defensive organisation – that lies ahead, and that must be taken up if the Super Eagles are to stand any chance of actually going all the way. Enthusiasm and energy will only get so far, especially against savvier, less self-sabotaging opposition.

What we got on Tuesday was like harvesting a cocoa pod and eating a bean: the hint of what chocolate should taste like, but only a hint. What comes next is refinement, and that is the hard, but necessary, bit.